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          社區大學開學 40公尺沙雕獻禮 宜蘭、羅東兩所社區大學本月24日開學，壯圍鄉後埤社區總動員，昨天完成1座長40公尺、寬10公尺的海景?辦公室出租F雕當開學大禮，開學日還將邀師生一起到海灘開趴，抓沙蟹、牽 酒店經紀罟。 宜蘭、羅東社區大學100年度的開學典禮很有漁鄉風情，選在壯圍鄉後埤社區的?婚禮顧問y上，社區發展協會理事長張樹欉與居民總動員，早在兩個月前就開始布置場地，昨天完成名為「 系統傢俱沙崙及海洋生物」的巨型沙雕造景，準備當開學獻禮。 沙雕造景是一堵長達40公尺的沙牆，排上社區名稱，再挖寬10公尺?酒店工作煽滌洁A景區裡有多座的大沙雕，有章魚、海豚、蛤蜊、海星、龍蝦等海中生物，可愛有童趣，「海星」造型卡通化，變身為海綿寶寶卡通裡 買屋的派大星，相當討喜。 後埤位在海邊，漁鄉風情濃，居民大多是討海人，張樹欉、總幹事張永德等人決定讓師生體驗漁民的甘苦，卯足全力安排漁鄉風情之 辦公室出租旅，把所有漁村的漁法遊戲化，一起拿出來與師生分享。 「布好陷阱，一起抓『沙爬仔』。」居民在沙灘上設下圓筒型陷阱，灑上炒得香噴噴的粗糠要誘捕俗稱「沙爬仔」的角眼沙 租屋蟹，編織牽罟網，腰間套上以黃槿樹皮織成的護具，一起古法捕魚，並從倉庫裡找出耙子，在海灘耙文蛤，另外，還有抓鰻苗、魚苗等體驗。 宜蘭社區大學校長林庭賢、羅東社區大學校長吳國維 辦公室出租等人昨天到後埤海灘，看到巨型沙雕與居民漁鄉遊戲，覺得好玩外，都相當感動，兩人希望藉此了解宜蘭海灘生態，沙崙防風林護岸的重要，融入後埤居民生活，發展社區的體驗活動。 【2011/04/22 室內裝潢聯合報】  .

          黃東明再創高蜂 堅持根留台灣 「與其西進南進，不如在地上進。」近來國內蜂蜜產業遭逢低迷期，但是宜蘭縣養蜂業者黃東明靠著自己努力，培育健康的蜂種，增加產量並研 帛琉發新產品，他的努力引起大陸官方重視並邀請前往投資設廠，但他堅持根留台灣。 黃東明原是苗栗養蜂人 酒店工作家，發現宜蘭山水秀麗，民國65年搬到宜蘭居住。 「早年就是騎著腳踏車，在鄉下採收蜂蜜。」黃東明說，有一次前縣長陳 新成屋定南會勘治山防洪工程時，無意間發現他正在採收，好奇與他長談，陳定南不斷點頭、做筆記，肯定這是無汙染的環保事業，隔年提報他當選宜蘭 ARMANI縣傑出農家，讓他奠定養蜂產業的信心。 53歲的黃東明養蜂34年，政府舉辦蜂蜜評鑑比賽，他一定報名參加，當成是對自家產品的「身體健康檢查」。他建立 買房子的「養蜂人家」品牌，產品年年得獎，曾接受總統表揚。 民國77年，農委會輔導成立全國第一個宜蘭市農會養蜂產銷班，由黃東明擔任班長至今，長達20年。這段期間，他曾 21世紀房屋仲介是十大農村青年、全國十大經典神農獎、全省模範農民，今年8月夫婦倆又榮獲農委會頒給優良蜂蜜雙頭等獎。 「逐花蕊而居，是辛苦的。」他走遍蘭陽平原每個區塊，民國90年選擇在員山鄉落?九份民宿}，成立一座「蜂采館」，當時他向銀行貸款2000萬元，負擔相當沈重。 黃東明要工作送貨，還要充當導覽解說，「我開的大卡車上，放著一套西裝。」隨時蜂采館員工打來一通電話，他馬上要回家，洗手換?酒肉朋友W西裝，就當起導覽解說員。 蜂采館第一年賠錢，第二年漸打開知名度，吸引12萬人次中小學生來此進行戶外教學，透過口耳相傳，帶來更多縣內外遊客參觀。 國內養蜂產業遭逢衝擊，蜜蜂神秘消失、蜂蜜減產，但黃東明深信凡事?辦公室出租n靠自己努力，他培育健康的蜂種，產業非但未受影響，最近還開發新產品，每項產品都經過「產銷履歷」認證，消費者看到報告書，就像是看到產品「身分證」，吃得更安心，黃東明不後悔走上這條養蜂的綠色產業。 【2008/08/18 聯合報】 網路行銷  .

          《美圖閃字動畫教學.2》 編製／晨良15.反轉後.點選取.選修改.點擴張.擴張2像素.點確定.並選一個新圖?禮服h.16.字的背景色擴張好後.選一個深 吳哥窟色系.在新的圖層上灌入底色.(在左方的顏色欄裡點擊?關鍵字廣告潀?會有更多的顏色可選).17.在新圖層灌好字的底色.然後取消選取.18. seo把灌好底色的圖層往下抓.至字的後面.並點擊兩次改好想要的名稱.19.在選濾鏡.點模糊.選高 膠原蛋白斯模糊.20.在選擇強度像素.自己拿捏.21.再將字底色與字結合連結成一個圖層.22.結合好成一個圖層時. 房屋出租再往下拉.複製成一個新圖層. 在選影像.點調整.選色相飽和度.來作顏色變化.23.色相飽和度有三個選項可自行調整.但顏色對 系統傢俱比無須太大.否則會很牽強. 24.依此類推.在把剛變色好的圖層.再往下拉.複製一個圖層.在新複製圖層上.再作色相變化.25.共有三層不同顏色?買屋漲r.分別點瞎與點開要存的圖層直接存GIF檔.26.圖1.與圖2.與24.講解同.27.將三張已存的圖檔.參考 《動畫教學》組合成GIF動畫.時間可自由調整.來製作圖?系統傢俱撠{字動圖.28.完成圖.這只是一個範例.閃字的創意.可由這個教學舉一反三.做出更漂亮的作品.那我編制教學圖解.才有意義.祝玩的愉快唷.~~^^"~~ 轉第《美圖閃字動畫教學 結婚.1》  .

          貪小失大 貪小失大 有位居士非常虔誠、精進，每天做完工作後就打坐定心，從無間斷。一天中午，他要做飯時，發現鹽罐子空了，如果到街上買 酒店經紀，要走很遠、花很多時間，所以，他就想先向隔壁鄰居借用一些。他走到鄰居 信用貸款家門口，門沒鎖，但怎麼叫都沒人回應。他心想：鹽是很便宜的東西，拿一點點應該沒關係吧！ 節能燈具於是就進入廚房，舀了一小湯匙的鹽帶回去。之後，他就把這件事給忘了。過了幾年，當他打坐時，總覺得眼前有?好房網@片白茫茫的東西，到底那是什麼呢？有一天，他終於想起來了！ 所謂「拿人一兩，還人千斤」，他趕快買了一千斤鹽送到隔壁。 租屋鄰居看到屋前堆了那麼多鹽，很驚訝地問：「這到底是怎麼一回事？」他說：「很抱歉，這些鹽是要還給你的。」 「你什麼時候欠我這麼多鹽？」 西服「幾年前的某一天，我從你家拿了一小湯匙的鹽，之後就忘了這件事。直到最近打坐時，不斷有障礙物出現在面前──一堆白茫茫的鹽。這提醒我因果可畏，現在若不?設計裝潢飢祫晼A將來不知要怎樣償還？雖然當時我偷取的鹽不到一兩，但是我願還你千斤來賠罪。」 鄰居聽了，疑惑地問，因果這麼可怕嗎？拿了這麼一點點東西也算是偷嗎？居士說，只 系統傢俱要拿取之前沒經過人家允許，就是偷盜了。 做人最重要的是要有誠懇的心，待人處事都應謹慎用心。不論生活是貧窮或富裕，都要明因果，安守本分，老實過日子。若內心起貪念，未經允許就將別人東 信用貸款西占為己有，不論搶多或偷少，點滴都在因果中。所以，千萬勿因惡小而為之。 .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 租辦公室  .

          More Burma Army troops along border with Wa Over 1,000 of Burmese soldiers were sent to Kunlon,Hopang,Takawng. More Burma Army troops along border with Wa Hundreds of Burmese soldiers are reported to have arrived along the border with the United Wa St 開幕活動ate Army (UWSA)-held territory following several disputes that had developed between them, according to reliable sources from the Sino-Burma border. By Hseng Khio Fah10 February 2009Over 1,0 吳哥窟00 of Burmese soldiers from Lashio, Tangyan and Monghsu were sent to Kunlong-Hopang, Takawng-Et and Tawansom, said a source.In mid January, the Burma Army and the UWSA had disputed over the territory boundary be 賣屋tween Panglong and Hopang, northern Shan State.The Burma Army accused UWSA that its troops had trespassed over their operative sector and told them to withdraw from the area.There is a motor road between Panglong and Hopang adm 21世紀房屋仲介inistered by the Burma Army in the west and the UWSA in the east.Both sides keep sending their forces to the area as the dispute between them became more strained.Another was the dispute over the planned bridge construction at Taweungieng, eas 票貼t of Monghsu township, where the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) has been using to cross into the Wa region, said a source.Last week, over 200 Burmese soldiers from Tangyan along with a truck carrying construction materials arrived Taweungieng near the S 吳哥窟alween River. The Burmese soldiers started to build a bridge over the crossing to the Wa region. But Wa officials warned them that there could be a fight between them if the Burma Army refused to stop, said a source. Concerning to the Burma Army’s containment policy on the 有巢氏房屋UWSA, some border watchers analyzed that there could be three reasons: The Burma Army was not satisfied with the UWSA when it designated its territory as the “Wa State Government Special Region” without its prior agreement. The 89 kg heroin seizure in Rangoon on 25 January was reported 澎湖民宿ly owned by a Chinese businessman, close to the UWSA. Since then he was said to be hiding in the UWSA territory. The last is to cut off geographical links between the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) and the Wa. In the meantime, the Wa side has also been instructing their checkpoints along its border to be 西裝 stricter. “Now the Namteuk bridge on the Namting cannot be crossed at will as in the past,” said a trader. “Its closed between 6pm and 6am. The measure may be good for security but bad for business.” Burma Army United Wa State Army http://www.shanland.org/war/2009/more-burma-army-troops-along-border-wit 西服h-wa  .

          歐盟東盟會議對緬甸既援助也不滿 東盟十國地理位置 歐盟東盟會議對緬甸既援助也不滿DWNEWS.COM-- 2007年3月23日23:48:34(京港臺時間) --多維新聞網 來稿﹕貌強Maung Chan（緬甸華族）由BURMA-UNPO得知﹕2007年3月14-15日兩天﹐歐盟與東盟雙方外長們﹐聚首于德國紐倫堡﹐一邊慶祝歐盟東盟建交30周年紀念﹐一邊歡愉地簽署了自由貿易協定──這是 裝潢37國（歐盟27國+東盟10國）之間的自由貿易。其實﹐除貿易合作外﹐背後還暗藏著亞洲安全與穩定利益。歐美西方想盡可能防止東盟向中國過度傾斜──和平崛起的中國﹐對東盟的影響力近年越來越大。還有一事﹕歐盟要東盟力促其成員國緬甸邁向民主與改善民生。要知東盟所以不顧一切接受緬甸 結婚西裝加盟﹐主要也是怕過于孤立的緬甸 ﹐會過分依賴中國。BURMA-UNPO披露﹕德國今年輪任歐盟主席。德國崇尚民主﹑人權﹑真正聯邦制度﹐一向鄙視緬甸軍政府的獨裁統治﹐對緬甸軍政府燒殺﹑搶劫﹑迫遷眾土族﹐以集體強奸土族妻女作為戰爭手段﹐嚴重侵犯人權等的一切作為﹐歷來表示無比憤概。德國一直要求緬 房屋貸款甸軍政府遵照聯合國大會呼吁﹕舉行軍政府﹑民主力量﹑眾土族力量三方政治對話﹐徹底解決緬甸政治問題﹐還特別要求無條件釋放主張非暴力斗爭的昂山素姬（Aung San Suu Kyi）。對緬甸﹐歐盟雖一直實施經濟制裁﹐盡量避免與緬甸獨裁軍政府來往。然而﹐出于人道援助的需要﹐德國外長Frank-Walter Steinmeier還是個別會見了緬 帛琉甸外長U Nyan Win﹐傳達歐盟對緬甸民主進程的關注﹐並代表歐盟向緬甸提供了一千萬歐元的人道援助﹐以幫助緬甸 人民對抗結核病與瘧疾。據歐盟的世界基督教團結組織CSW（Christian Solidarity Worldwide）實地調查﹕克倫族基督徒世世代代生活在緬甸東南部泰緬邊界地帶﹐自1996年以來﹐3000克倫族村莊被緬軍摧毀﹐近百萬克倫族村民?襯衫y離失所﹐約15萬克倫族村民逃往泰國難民營。最近緬軍的堅壁清野戰術﹐手段更殘忍﹐破壞力更大﹐克倫族村民更是處于水深火熱大苦大難中。( 軍政府為了要賣電力給泰國﹐正在趕建薩爾溫江（Salween River）水壩﹐因而大量強行拆遷沿江一帶的克倫族﹑克倫尼族﹑孟族﹑撣族等原住民。僅僅2006年10月﹐緬軍就迫遷了50萬土族村民。緬軍還強迫土族村民為他們搬運 房地產開路掃除障礙物等。在緬軍發動戰爭的土族區﹐緬軍甚至驅使土族村民走在前面﹐借用土族村民的肉身試探埋藏在地下的地雷陣。眾土族的基督徒還向世界基督教團結組織哭訴﹕在上學﹑工作與日常生活中﹐他們受到雙重歧視與壓迫﹕一。因為他們不是緬族──他們是撣族（Shan）﹑孟族（Mon）﹑克倫族（Karen）﹑克倫尼族（Karenni）﹑克欽族（Kachin）﹑欽族（Chin）等等 酒店兼職﹐二。他們信仰基督教。今年二月﹐欽族婦女協會代表還到聯合國大會前狀告緬軍暴行﹐發言人Cheery Zahau女士指出﹕集體強奸土族婦女是緬軍的戰爭手段。荷蘭緬甸中心（Burma Centrum Nederland）告訴記者﹕全國民主聯盟NLD芳齡35歲的青年部女領導人素素娜薇（Su Su Nway）﹐由于把軍政府強迫村民無償勞役的事實﹐告訴了國際勞工組織﹐結果她被當地官員判刑勞改。2004年她出獄後﹐到處控?買屋網i無法無天的當地官員﹐事件鬧大而暫獲勝訴﹐因而當地官員被判入獄。然而﹐繼任的新官﹐卻為那入獄官員翻案﹐並以毀謗地方政府官員罪﹐判素素娜薇入獄18個月。在聯合國屬下國際勞工會﹑非政府機構NGO等的連鎖義憤反應下﹐該年六月她獲釋放﹐但當地官員還是不斷伺機找她麻煩。最近緬甸軍隊在克倫邦﹑克倫尼邦﹑孟邦﹑撣邦進行圍剿﹐燒殺﹑搶劫﹑強奸﹑迫遷。。。。。千千萬萬內戰難民躲藏在當地深山密林中?婚禮佈置M近萬難民逃亡到泰緬邊境的聯合國難民營。為了防止滔天暴行消息外泄﹐緬甸軍政府起先下令駐扎在眾土族邦的“國際人道援助機構”﹑“國際紅十字會”等國際機構不得接觸難民﹐凡“犯規”的國際機構就會被下令關閉。僅僅3月16日那天﹐緬甸 軍政府就同時關閉了孟邦（Mon State）與撣邦（Shan State）的兩所“國際紅十字會”。 （2007年3月23日)http://www5.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/Topics/2007_3_23_11_48_34_304.html 新成屋  .

          (轉貼)四大高峰會 從本週開始已經陸續舉辦的聯合國氣候變化高峰會、第64屆聯合國大會一般性辯論、安理會核不擴散與核武裁軍問題高峰會，以及在匹茲堡所舉行的G20金融高 峰會等四大高峰會，各國領袖齊聚一堂討論傳統安全與非傳統安全議題，讓國際社會目不 租屋網暇給，只是在這麼短的時間內要討論那麼多議題，是否能夠達成具體的協 議，也是各國領袖的一大考驗。 本次召開的聯合國氣候變化高峰會，目的是在為12月召開的哥本哈根 面膜會議凝聚政治共識，這裡面主要的目標包括：一、各方加強團結合作，共同應對氣候變化；二、各方履行共同但有區別的責任原則，實現互利共贏；三、各方共同努力推動哥本哈根會議取得積極成果。  事 房屋買賣實上，全球氣候變化議題已經是當前影響各國安全最重要的非傳統安全議題，聯合國秘書長潘基文就說了他到北極的考察經驗。他說，那裡的冰川正在融化，這是 一次令人震撼的可怕經歷，氣候變化的速度遠遠超出了人們的想象。為 澎湖民宿了因應氣候變化所帶來的人類危機，12月召開的「哥本哈根會議」中，將要制定「京都氣候 保護公約後續協議」，這項協議能否順利達成，就顯得有急迫性。  另外，23日聯合國大會在聯合國總部舉行一般性辯論，共有140多個國家的政治 裝潢領袖出席，共同就國際形勢、聯合國作用以及重大國際和地區問題闡述看法。其 中尤以近年來聯合國的維和行動一再遭到失敗的挫折，這已經讓聯合國在這項功能失去了可信度，因此檢討聯合國的作用，將是這次聯合國一般性辯論中最重要的議 題。  而9月 烤肉24日在聯合國總部舉行的安理會核不擴散與核裁軍高峰會，這是安理會有史以來首次專門就核不擴散與核武裁軍等問題舉行的高峰會。中共國家主席胡錦濤 將在會上發表講話，他將針對國際社會關心的核武裁軍、核不擴散、和平利用核能及核安全問題提出看法，這被視為是這次高峰會的?小型辦公室D要焦點。  至於24、25日在美國匹茲堡舉行的第三次G20高峰會，如何為過去兩次高峰會所制訂的全球金融海嘯救市措施，找到一個最佳的「退出戰略」，將是這次高峰會最受矚目的焦點之一。  所謂「退出戰略」是指逐步收回在金融危機過程中實施的擴張性貨幣、財政政策的戰略。 個人信貸去年11月中旬，G20領袖在華盛頓舉行首次高峰會時，與會各國制定出 包含40項措施的方案，以制止危機進一步擴大。今年4月在英國倫敦舉行的第二次G20高峰會時，各國同意動用1萬1千億美元的巨額資金，為最貧窮的國家度 過危機提供支持，並促使世界貿易重新恢復活力。如今全球的危機感已逐漸減弱，因此如何在不影 酒店打工響全球經濟復甦的情況下，制定「退出戰略」就變得十分重要。  以上四大高峰會在一週內舉行，到底一次大拜拜，還是真能解決問題，值得大家拭目以待。（本文寫給漢聲短評）   .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 結婚  .

          重探英國核武 Reinvestigation on Britain’s Nuclear Weapons Ta-chen Cheng Abstract To own nuclear weapons was viewed as a privilege during the Cold War, if not until today, in international relations. As ultimate tools for war, however, have nuclear weapons really enhanced nuclear powers’ influence and power, no matter in peace or wartime? Such question may need separate considerations and this paper has chosen Britain, a medium Nuclear Power as a case for study. From aspects of the symbol of great power, contribution to NATO, national deterrence and the influences on American policy, this paper recognises that nuclear weapons has made contributions to Britain’s international influences and power, but such promotion shall not be exaggerated. Keywords: Britain, nuclear weapons Introduction Britain’s development of nuclear weapons is an early phenomenon, which can be traced back to the beginning of the 1940s. After a short period of independent research, Britain joined American atomic programmes and its scientists played a very important role in the Manhattan Project. In October 1952, Britain exploded its first atomic bomb, and officially became the third member of the nuclear club. The British acquired thermonuclear technology and tested their first H-bomb in May 1957. In terms of delivery systems, from V-bombers to Polaris to Trident SSBN, Britain has effectively demonstrated its credible capabilities of nuclear deterrence, aimed to prevent any aggression at all times. As a nuclear Power, however, have nuclear weapons really, or how much have they, strengthened Britain’s influence and power in the world?[1] In retrospect, successive British governments, despite some provocative election manifestos, have all retained nuclear forces as an indispensable part of defence posture. Such policy might perhaps be well justified itself at the time when nuclear war between two politically divisive and militarily hostile blocs was a likely scenario. Nevertheless, when the Cold War is over, the meaning of nuclear confrontation has drastically changed by nature. It will be helpful, if not urgent, to re-examine Britain’s nuclear weapons in a more practical fashion. Such investigation is particularly significant as not only have other Nuclear Powers been scrutinising the role or necessity of their nuclear forces and strategy per se in the new context of international politics, but also more deta 燒烤iled and objective thinking are required for British defence policy-makers to consider what Britain needs for its defence in the post-Trident era. Methodologically, this paper would identify four motives to support Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons, and then discuss and assess accordingly to know if nuclear weapons did contribute an essential part to Britain’s overall defence posture. Hopefully such approach can provide some stimulation for this topic. Symbol of Great Power Status Britain is one of the first countries to develop atomic bombs during the WWII, and has acquired impressive research results in the early 1940s. One of the most key reasons, interestingly, that the British decided to develop atomic weapons was the obsession, though somehow overvalued at all, of the belief that “those first get control the world”, and therefore it was necessary to produce an operational bomb soon before the Germans did. After WWII, the Germans were no longer counted as a menace to the UK but the possession of nuclear weapons had remained as a more political issue rather than simply being with strategic implications.[2] From the perspectives of political status and historical glory, many British could hardly abandon the pretensions that the UK was still a Great Empire; even it had suffered seriously during two world wars. Accordingly, most of the early post-war British defence policy-makers might entertain an idea that whatever the Americans and later Soviets possessed, Britain as a Great Power, even less great, must also have.[3] To save national dignity and ensure continuing of political status, the solution was made to acquire independent deterrent, even much effort was needed.[4] The motive of preserving the great powerhood played an important role in Britain’s nuclear development, but the nature of Cold War and economic reality had forced the British seriously think about nuclear weapons by a more military/strategic-oriented approach,[5] rather than simply out of the consideration of Great Power status. Nevertheless, many supporters still believe in the prestige and self-esteem nuclear weapons would bring, even though such fame might be just of a symbol. Contributions to NATO’s nuclear deterrence The Cold War structure had made Britain, which initially viewed nuclear weapons as a sine qua non toward w 21世紀房屋仲介orld power status gradually accept that an “interdependent” deterrence, rather than an “independent” one, would be adequate to its own need,[6] and thus subscribe to NATO, a collective security system as major defence reliance against Soviet threats in Europe. Since 1954, Britain had promised to sustain four divisions and tactical air forces on the continent as long as NATO felt such forces were required.[7] After Nassau in 1962, the British further legally committed their SLBM forces, i.e. Polaris, then Trident to NATO and targeted in accordance with alliance policy and strategic concepts under plans made by the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR),[8] although Britain’s right to withdraw is undisputable. Since the Germans rearmed themselves and provided considerable conventional forces to NATO, Britain’s nuclear commitment to NATO, including strategic forces and tactical units of British Army of Rhine (BAOR), had significantly boosted UK’s international influence within this security system. Some European countries, especially France were apparently more willing to see the Germans’ military influence offset by the British deterrent. As the second, and the only European nuclear state in the NATO military commands, nuclear weapons could distinguish Britain from other non-nuclear members, and its nuclear contribution became a valuable, though perhaps mostly subordinate part of NATO’s overall nuclear posture. After the end of Cold War, Britain continues to assign its nuclear forces to NATO. In the famous 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), it was claimed that “in present conditions nuclear deterrence still has an important contribution to make in insuring against the re-emergence of major strategic military threats, in preventing nuclear coercion, and in preserving peace and stability in Europe.”[9] With less and less possibility of using nuclear weapons, UK’s Trident, whose strategic and sub-strategic roles have been proposed, still constitutes an indispensable pillar, at least psychologically for NATO’s defence. National deterrence From a perspective of British interests, the US was viewed as an important ally for sure, but in terms of nuclear strategy, unfortunately, the Americans were not the one who could be completely relied on. During the Cold War, Britain had prepared two sets of nuclear targeting plans separately for NATO commitment and it 辦公室出租s national necessity. L. Freedman has used Bomber Command as an example to explain the differences. “For Britain, Soviet theatre systems would be a higher priority. If SAC was planning a strike with a substantial counterforce element at that time, then it would have made sense for Bomber Command to concentrate on Soviet medium-range aircraft and missile bases. If, however, Britain were expected to act alone, then a counterforce attack would have been inappropriate as, acting on its own, Britain could barely have made a dent in Soviet nuclear capabilities. Urban-industrial centres were also a lower US priority, so again British concentration on there targets would have not contradicted American plans.”[10] Indeed, as national deterrent,[11] British nuclear forces, though claimed to be an inseparable part of NATO’s deterrent, were signified by their independent functions.[12] Ernest Bevin ever reckoned that British nuclear deterrent, as the “Third Force”, could offset American-Soviet bipolarity.[13] Moreover, the existence of a second centre of decision, as some suggested, would ensure that even if the US did not use nuclear weapons in response to Soviet aggression in Europe, Britain, being much more directly affected, certainly would, and the Soviet leaders would know this. According to such rationale, possession of national nuclear deterrent could provide Britain more strategic flexibility and credibility if its national interests and security were threatened, and equally importantly could enhance Britain’s capability and influence as an “operational” nuclear Power. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not lead to discontinuity of Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons. The Labour Government, widely-known for its traditional anti-nuclear attitude, did not officially express any intention to discard nuclear deterrent though at present Britain’s nuclear force has been limited to Trident with reduced warheads. New Labour’s defence white papers, including the 1998 SDR, all insist that possession of nuclear weapons would be still necessary to assure Minimum Deterrence to those unknown enemy while vital national interests are at danger. Also, the British governments have not for a long time regarded Minimum Deterrence inconsistent with a policy designed to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states.[14] As the ultimate guarantee of national security, Britain’s nucle 酒店工作ar force is unlikely to be scrapped in a near future. Influence on American strategic postures Since Britain has chosen the US as a major ally through the transatlantic approach, the possession of nuclear weapons had been said to hopefully provide additional political and strategic advantages of strengthening the British claim to a special relationship with the US.[15] In fact, to many British, especially those in the military circles, the US would seriously consult with Britain on nuclear matters only if the latter possessed nuclear deterrent. Without credible national nuclear capacities, Britain could hardly retain its security and interests through NATO or the special relationship. As Sir Henry Tizard commented, “we feel that to have no share in what is recognised as the main deterrent in the cold war and the only allied offensive in a World War, would seriously weaken British influences on United States policy; and planning in the cold war, and in war, would mean that the United Kingdom would have no claim to any share in the policy and planning of the offensive.”[16] Sir John Slessor, another prominent military figure of British strategic thinking of his time, also believed that without national nuclear capabilities, “in peace, in the cold war, we should lose what influence we have on American policy and strategic planning. And if it came to hot war, we should have little or no say in the direction of Allied strategy or in the determination of terms of peace. We should be just one of the minor Powers.”[17] Analysis and Assessment The destructive power of nuclear weapons is unprecedented, and is viewed by many as the ultimate guarantee of national security. It will make sense to argue that possession of nuclear weapons by Britain, as the third member of the nuclear club, has somehow strengthened its power and influence in the world from several aspects previously discussed. Nevertheless, from other perspectives, or at least for some critics, such power and influence generated by nuclear weapons shall not be inappropriately exaggerated, and it is also very dangerous to put too much emphasis on such possession. The reasons are as follows. On Great Power Status In terms of Great Power status, nuclear weapons indeed have provided good qualifications, if not always, at least for a while after WWII. However, a membership of the nuclea 褐藻醣膠r club is not the only condition and cannot always guarantee international privilege. The following political, economic and technological developments all revealed the fact that the British could not possibly maintain their great powerhood simply by owing a few atomic bombs. The Suez crisis and other overseas contingencies, in which nuclear weapons were practically inapplicable, exposed the weakness of Britain’s economic and military capabilities. As criticism goes, nuclear weapons are just like an insurance policy for cancers, but useless for mild or even common illness. Without other effective supplements, such as credible conventional forces and strong economic performances, Britain can hardly remind other countries of its greatness. Britain’s expectation for sustaining its Great Power status was further challenged by the fact that its effective nuclear capacities required American assistance of various kinds. Indeed and realistically, no one, except those extreme patriots, would expect or ask Britain, especially during the Cold War period, to be “the greatest” or “great enough” as two superpowers, but foreign assistances were apparently not a positive feature of greatness. In fact, Britain is the only dependent nuclear power of the Big Five. It is e a weak statement to argue that as a “Great Power”, Britain’s nuclear capabilities cannot be independent, even though from financial viewpoints, its transfer deals with the US were quite favourable. On Contributions to NATO Compared with the military value, Britain’s nuclear deterrent can equally, if not more, provide it with additional political influences within the NATO system. By assigning its nuclear forces to NATO, Britain could logically transform these assets into political and diplomatic chips on the decision-making or bargaining tables. After the departure of France, Britain, as the second nuclear power in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, was more satisfied with the influence it had, while remaining some flexibility for its own strategic planning. Yet, it shall be reminded that NATO is an organisation under the political and military dominance of the US, which possessed much more nuclear weapons. It is natural to assume that NATO’s nuclear posture, including doctrines, operations and planning, predominantly reflected, or at least did not possibly violate, the viewpoints and interests of Washington.[18] It was quite qu 永慶房屋estionable that how much influence Britain could have simply by means of few nuclear stockpiles. However, it would be also improper to conclude that the British had no or little say in NATO’s strategic planning. In 1967, it was London and Bonn forced Washington to reach a compromised version of Flexible Response doctrine. But it was the political and military worth of the UK, rather than simply its nuclear weapons that made the US recede. Otherwise, West Germany, which had no “national” nuclear forces, could not likely join and play an important role in the change of NATO’s nuclear posture like those countries also deployed American nuclear weapons. Another example was the US proposal for the multilateral nuclear forces (MLF) in the 1960s. As some American officials insisted, the necessity to include Britain into that structure was not because its “tiny” nuclear forces, but the political needs to prevent West Germany as the dominant power within.[19] Again, it was Britain’s political leverage that mattered. On National Deterrence As an instrument of deterrence, nuclear weapons without doubt have increased British sense of security for countering Soviet aggressions. Interdependent deterrent would aim to attack targets, which the Americans attached lower priorities, such as submarine and medium-ranged air/missile bases. Meanwhile, considering the huge expenses on nuclear weapons, Britain’s doctrine of Minimum Deterrence seemed to satisfy its financial as well as strategic requirements. But even nuclear weapons are to be viewed as an effective protector of national security and can increase national military strength; their practical functions shall not be over-estimated and are restricted to the following circumstances. First of all, nuclear weapons, especially of the strategic level, are essentially the last resort, and for many anti-nuclear campaigners, are equivalent to the tools for suicide. To a populous island like Britain, the risk and cost of using nuclear weapons will be disastrous no matter in terms of the first attack or second strike. Secondly, the credibility of Britain’s Minimum Deterrence will be considerably reduced if without collaboration with NATO and of course, the US. This is the reason why since the late 1950s, Britain has decided to secure greater US strategic cooperation and to lay its nuclear posture on alliance.[20] Without the collective defence of NATO, Britain’s nuclear force alone is unlike to exert further active in 東森房屋fluences. Thirdly, as Britain tried to establish a second decision-making centre, such “independent” ideas, however, were not appreciated by the Americans.[21] According to US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, all decisions on nuclear weapons in NATO should be concentrated in one centre- Washington.[22] Division of nuclear command, which second decision-making theories could cause, would only complicate processes of decision-making and proliferation. Without Americans’ support and recognition, Britain’s second centre theories could not be properly accommodated into the NATO framework, which the British reckoned as the most crucial defence mechanism. Consequently, interdependence, if not dependence by nature, became the major objective of British nuclear doctrine and policy, and the role and influence of national Minimum Deterrence should not be overestimated. On Influencing the Americans Another issue raised is Britain’s influence on American strategic posture by owing nuclear weapons. Most readers would remember the post war unwillingness of the US to share nuclear development and research information had pushed Britain into a chiefly indigenous programme until the 1954, then 1958 revision of the McMahon Act. The following unbalanced development again frustrated Britain’s dignity and independence. The US, as an ally, was rarely asking British participation on the formation of combined nuclear targeting planning against Soviet threats. A noted scholar has made such comments: “Although a considerable amount of joint Anglo-American military planning was already under way, the question of the strategic employment of nuclear weapons was absolutely excluded.”[23] In terms of other nuclear policies, Washington seldom appreciated London’s proposals as well. For example, the US did not accept Britain’s proposition on international control of bomb after war,[24] and was lukewarm to UK’s nuclear disarmament effort, except 1963 treaty.[25] Washington also uncomfortably downplayed London’s anxiety for the risk of increasing conventional forces in Europe when the former was selling its Flexible Response ideas. Perhaps, Americans’ arrogance might come from the fact that the British needed US nuclear assistances, no matter in terms of politics and technology.[26] By contrast, Britain’s nuclear policy had always been influenced by the Americans since the very early stage of nuclear development. Again, if London could do some influences on the nuclear pol 有巢氏房屋icy-makers in Washington, that was mostly because of its political weight, not of possession of nuclear weapons. Conclusion The destructive power of nuclear weapons is catastrophic and has changed many strategic issues since their invention. By joining the nuclear club, even with limited capabilities, Britain in a sense has strengthened its power and influence in the world. From other perspectives, however, such promotion shall not be exaggerated. As the ultimate guarantee of national security, as some supporters claimed, nuclear weapons cannot be the only insurance policy for a state or the only element leading to greatness, no matter in peacetime or at war. In fact, to many, nuclear weapons alone cannot practically make Britain greater than other non-nuclear Powers, say Germany and Japan in terms of international status. If the UK can reserve a seat in the top group, that is because of its comprehensive national capabilities, not simply because of nuclear weapons. Finally, nuclear weapons as a deterrent was proven effective, at least somewhat psychologically, in the Cold War period, but after then, can nuclear deterrence still be credible for future grand strategy? Can a membership in the nuclear club continue providing Britain as many credits as before? Indeed, current threats no longer come from a nuclear giant bear of Siberia, and require new thinking under new international circumstances. It will be very important for the British to carefully think about what to do for the post-Trident era by efficiently using defence budget for a better security. Reference Books l Ball, Desmond and Richelson, Jeffery (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986) l Beach, Hugh and Gurr, Nadine, Flattering the Passions or, the Bomb and Britain’s Bid for a World Role (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999) l Bracken, Paul, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1983) l Clark, Ian and Wheeler, Nicholas J., The British Origin of Nuclear Strategy 1945-1955 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1989) l Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan Press, 1981) l French, David, The British Way in Warfare: 1688-2000 (London: Unwin Hyman ltd, 1990) l Groom, A. J. R., British Thinking Abo 賣房子ut Nuclear Weapons (London: Frances Pinter, 1974) l Malone, Peter, The British Nuclear Deterrent (London: Croom Helm, 1984) l Navias, Martin S., Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning: 1955-1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) l Paterson, Robert, Britain’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrence: from before the V-bombers to beyond Trident (London: Frank Cass & co ltd., 1997) l Pierre, Andrew J., Nuclear Politics: the British experience with an independent strategic force: 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) l Rosecrane, R. N. (ed), The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: strategy and politics (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964) l Simpson, John, The Independent Nuclear State: the United States, Britain and the military atom (London: Macmillan, 1986) l Slessor, J., The Great Deterrent (London: Cassell & co., 1957) Government Publications and Political Documents l The Labour Party, Report of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Labour Party (London: Transport House, 1957) l Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review CM3999 (London: HMSO, 1998) Journals l International Relations, 2-2, October 1965 (Garnet, J. C., “The Defence Debate”) l Political Science Quarterly, 80-1, March 1965 (Kohl, Wilfrid L., “Nuclear Sharing in NATO and the Multilateral Force”) About the author Ta-chen Cheng e-mail: yourdonason@yahoo.com Address: 11 Poplar Avenue, Reynoldson Street, Hull, HU5 3BW, United Kingdom The author is a Ph.D. student in University of Hull, England, Member of Taiwan Strategy Research Association, and UK Representative of the Office of Legislator Nelson C. L. Ku. [1] J. C. Garnett suggested a number of possible functions of British deterrent. Firstly, nuclear deterrent increased Britain’s influence with NATO and, in particular, with the United States. Secondly, nuclear deterrent Britain’s bargaining power in negotiation for nuclear test agreements and disarmament. The third task was to provide increased military power to support political policies outside the NATO area, namely in the global context. The fourth function was to provide Britain with a guarantee that if war were to break out in Europe, the United States would be involved. J. C. Garnet, “The Defence Debate”, in International Relations, vol. II, No. 2, October 1965, pp.81 酒肉朋友3-29.  .

          台股盤前－美股軟趴趴 台灣選情緊繃 加權指數恐倒退嚕 鉅亨網 記者陳慧琳‧台北 台股今(17)日將進入選前倒數黃金周，加上美股負面消息仍不斷迸出，道瓊指數周六凌晨?訂做禮服垣嬰岈I，預期上周五收跌的台股加權指數 8161.39，今日恐怕再臨下修壓力，但8000點關卡應有強力支撐。 美 小額信貸股近期負面消息不斷，美國四大指數小幅破底後有試圖打底狀況，近期台股受美股相較亞洲其他國家波及度較不高，但仍不可不留意。截至 設計裝潢3/7，美國S＆P500企業已有490家企業公佈財報，獲利年增率為 -22.8%，獲利持續衰退，法人表示，明天(18日) Fed將宣佈是否降息，市場預期降 3碼的比重 濾桶高達 8成，結果是否如市場預期，將牽動全球股市表現。 法人表示，在技術線型方面，日線遇年線壓力回檔並破月線8262點，週 K線在之前連續四連紅後，本週 西裝外套收根粗黑 K棒，短線日KD交叉向下，呈高檔鈍化，短期先觀察指數能否再度站上月線。由於進入選前一周，市場氣氛轉為觀望保守，三大法人上週開始轉為賣超，獲利了結、退而觀望的賣壓?新成屋耤C 從籌碼面觀察，大盤指數從7384點上漲至8658點，上漲17.25%，融資餘額從2947億元上升至3134億元，上升幅度只有 6.34%，上漲速度不及大盤，顯見短線籌碼相對穩定。不過，上週三大法人 住商房屋合計賣超497.24億元，週四、五成交量降至約1100億元，觀望氣氛濃厚，選前量能再放大機率不高。 法人表示，目前仍是類股輪動的格局，建議仍採電子、傳產均衡佈局的策略，在傳產股方面，由於中國大陸於雪災後，已祭出 帛琉一連串的挽救措施，將有利於傳產、中概、原物料等類股重新恢復成長動能。 另外，金融、資產、觀光等內需股則受惠於新台幣升值及選舉題材，回穩後可逢低佈局；電子股部分，則以 TFT產業前景較為明朗且獲利穩定。另外， 西服在油價飆漲之下，節能、替代性能源相關族群具表現機會，利基型IC設計族群在員工分紅費用化影響性鈍化後，亦可逢低介入。 .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 宜蘭民宿  .

          亞馬遜採用元太電子紙顯示器，元太客戶規模將持續擴大 【時報-記者莊丙農台北報導】 全球最大網路書店亞馬遜 (Amazon.com)採用元太(8069)電子紙顯示器，推出自有品牌名為「Kindle」的電子書閱讀器，挾帶龐大的通路優勢，搶攻可攜式數位內容下載產業的市場。Amazon將 酒店經紀會繼SONY之後，帶動另一波可攜式數位內容下載產業的銷售熱潮，而專攻電子紙顯示器的元太在市場及客戶規模持續擴大下，將邁入新的里程碑。 Amazon於美國時間11月19日 推出電子書閱讀器，以及書籍數位 21世紀房屋仲介版的下載服務。這兩項新嘗試將再度挑戰人類幾百年來閱讀紙版書的習慣，更可能把資訊的傳播帶入新的紀元。Amazon是全球最大網路書店，於1995年7月正式成立，自2005年4月起歐洲最大網路書店Mobipocket亦正式成為Amazon 酒店經紀旗下公司。 Amazon推出的電子書閱讀器名為Kindle，該產品讓消費者不需費心尋找Wi-Fi熱點，可以透過先進的高速資料傳輸網路EVDO直接上網連接到Amazon的網路書店。可隨時隨地無線上網的電子書閱讀器是這類裝置推出以來的最大革命，打破 新成屋以往必須與電腦連接才能下載書籍或文章，是一項顯著的進步。元太科技董事長劉思誠表示 「我們相信Amazon推出的Kindle電子書閱讀器將會引爆新一波的閱讀革命。藉由元太科技的電子紙顯示器技術與Amazon所擁有的全球陣容最堅強電子書庫支援下，全球可攜式數?室內設計鴗漁e下載市場上必會帶來相當可觀的爆發性成長。」。 Kindle最大的特色及主要創新為，利用無線通訊系統進行網路連結，消費者無須與電腦相連接就能夠下載數位內容及進行上網瀏覽的功能，且不需支付任何無線系統使用及傳輸費用，在移動性及便利性上都佔有相當的優勢。數 酒店經紀位圖書閱讀裝置不是為取代一本書，而是為取代一大疊書，亦便利用戶在旅途中、地鐵上、機場中使用。Kindle不只是可以利用無線傳輸方式從 Amazon 的線上書城直接下載及瀏覽電子書，且大部份書籍的第一章節，可供免費閱讀，供消費者判斷這本書是否為消費者想看的內容。目前可供下載的書籍 酒店兼職，已達88,000本規模。 Kindle使用元太所提供的6英吋電子紙顯示器，解析度為800x600畫素，內建256MB記憶體，可儲存約200本電子書。同時Kindle不只是電子書閱讀器，也是電子報紙與電子雜誌閱讀器，消費者已可選擇訂閱「紐約時報」、「時代雜誌」、「華爾街日報」、「華盛頓郵報」、「Atlantic Mont 帛琉hly」、法國世界報「Le Monde」、等各大數位內容。 Kindle特別之處不只於此，使用者可利用其中的電子郵件服務接收Word文件或照片(.JPG,.GIF,.BMP,.PNG)檔案，再以書籍形式儲存在裝置的資料庫內。讓使用者驚豔處還有可以用「不到一分鐘」的時間直接從網路上下載整本書的內容，而且也可以直接連結超過250個知名的部落格網站。 房屋貸款Amazon還特別推出紐約時報暢銷書排行榜和各類新書的Kindle版均特價9.99美元(美國市場一般實體書售價約為13美元至17美元之間)，因為過去電子版的書價通常和實體版幾乎一樣，扼殺了民眾轉讀電子書的意願。 .msgcontent .wsharing ul li { text-indent: 0; } 分享 Facebook Plurk YAHOO! 婚禮顧問  .