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          重探英國核武 Reinvestigation on Britain’s Nuclear Weapons Ta-chen Cheng Abstract To own nuclear weapons was viewed as a privilege during the Cold War, if not until today, in international relations. As ultimate tools for war, however, have nuclear weapons really enhanced nuclear powers’ influence and power, no matter in peace or wartime? Such question may need separate considerations and this paper has chosen Britain, a medium Nuclear Power as a case for study. From aspects of the symbol of great power, contribution to NATO, national deterrence and the influences on American policy, this paper recognises that nuclear weapons has made contributions to Britain’s international influences and power, but such promotion shall not be exaggerated. Keywords: Britain, nuclear weapons Introduction Britain’s development of nuclear weapons is an early phenomenon, which can be traced back to the beginning of the 1940s. After a short period of independent research, Britain joined American atomic programmes and its scientists played a very important role in the Manhattan Project. In October 1952, Britain exploded its first atomic bomb, and officially became the third member of the nuclear club. The British acquired thermonuclear technology and tested their first H-bomb in May 1957. In terms of delivery systems, from V-bombers to Polaris to Trident SSBN, Britain has effectively demonstrated its credible capabilities of nuclear deterrence, aimed to prevent any aggression at all times. As a nuclear Power, however, have nuclear weapons really, or how much have they, strengthened Britain’s influence and power in the world?[1] In retrospect, successive British governments, despite some provocative election manifestos, have all retained nuclear forces as an indispensable part of defence posture. Such policy might perhaps be well justified itself at the time when nuclear war between two politically divisive and militarily hostile blocs was a likely scenario. Nevertheless, when the Cold War is over, the meaning of nuclear confrontation has drastically changed by nature. It will be helpful, if not urgent, to re-examine Britain’s nuclear weapons in a more practical fashion. Such investigation is particularly significant as not only have other Nuclear Powers been scrutinising the role or necessity of their nuclear forces and strategy per se in the new context of international politics, but also more deta 燒烤iled and objective thinking are required for British defence policy-makers to consider what Britain needs for its defence in the post-Trident era. Methodologically, this paper would identify four motives to support Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons, and then discuss and assess accordingly to know if nuclear weapons did contribute an essential part to Britain’s overall defence posture. Hopefully such approach can provide some stimulation for this topic. Symbol of Great Power Status Britain is one of the first countries to develop atomic bombs during the WWII, and has acquired impressive research results in the early 1940s. One of the most key reasons, interestingly, that the British decided to develop atomic weapons was the obsession, though somehow overvalued at all, of the belief that “those first get control the world”, and therefore it was necessary to produce an operational bomb soon before the Germans did. After WWII, the Germans were no longer counted as a menace to the UK but the possession of nuclear weapons had remained as a more political issue rather than simply being with strategic implications.[2] From the perspectives of political status and historical glory, many British could hardly abandon the pretensions that the UK was still a Great Empire; even it had suffered seriously during two world wars. Accordingly, most of the early post-war British defence policy-makers might entertain an idea that whatever the Americans and later Soviets possessed, Britain as a Great Power, even less great, must also have.[3] To save national dignity and ensure continuing of political status, the solution was made to acquire independent deterrent, even much effort was needed.[4] The motive of preserving the great powerhood played an important role in Britain’s nuclear development, but the nature of Cold War and economic reality had forced the British seriously think about nuclear weapons by a more military/strategic-oriented approach,[5] rather than simply out of the consideration of Great Power status. Nevertheless, many supporters still believe in the prestige and self-esteem nuclear weapons would bring, even though such fame might be just of a symbol. Contributions to NATO’s nuclear deterrence The Cold War structure had made Britain, which initially viewed nuclear weapons as a sine qua non toward w 21世紀房屋仲介orld power status gradually accept that an “interdependent” deterrence, rather than an “independent” one, would be adequate to its own need,[6] and thus subscribe to NATO, a collective security system as major defence reliance against Soviet threats in Europe. Since 1954, Britain had promised to sustain four divisions and tactical air forces on the continent as long as NATO felt such forces were required.[7] After Nassau in 1962, the British further legally committed their SLBM forces, i.e. Polaris, then Trident to NATO and targeted in accordance with alliance policy and strategic concepts under plans made by the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR),[8] although Britain’s right to withdraw is undisputable. Since the Germans rearmed themselves and provided considerable conventional forces to NATO, Britain’s nuclear commitment to NATO, including strategic forces and tactical units of British Army of Rhine (BAOR), had significantly boosted UK’s international influence within this security system. Some European countries, especially France were apparently more willing to see the Germans’ military influence offset by the British deterrent. As the second, and the only European nuclear state in the NATO military commands, nuclear weapons could distinguish Britain from other non-nuclear members, and its nuclear contribution became a valuable, though perhaps mostly subordinate part of NATO’s overall nuclear posture. After the end of Cold War, Britain continues to assign its nuclear forces to NATO. In the famous 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), it was claimed that “in present conditions nuclear deterrence still has an important contribution to make in insuring against the re-emergence of major strategic military threats, in preventing nuclear coercion, and in preserving peace and stability in Europe.”[9] With less and less possibility of using nuclear weapons, UK’s Trident, whose strategic and sub-strategic roles have been proposed, still constitutes an indispensable pillar, at least psychologically for NATO’s defence. National deterrence From a perspective of British interests, the US was viewed as an important ally for sure, but in terms of nuclear strategy, unfortunately, the Americans were not the one who could be completely relied on. During the Cold War, Britain had prepared two sets of nuclear targeting plans separately for NATO commitment and it 辦公室出租s national necessity. L. Freedman has used Bomber Command as an example to explain the differences. “For Britain, Soviet theatre systems would be a higher priority. If SAC was planning a strike with a substantial counterforce element at that time, then it would have made sense for Bomber Command to concentrate on Soviet medium-range aircraft and missile bases. If, however, Britain were expected to act alone, then a counterforce attack would have been inappropriate as, acting on its own, Britain could barely have made a dent in Soviet nuclear capabilities. Urban-industrial centres were also a lower US priority, so again British concentration on there targets would have not contradicted American plans.”[10] Indeed, as national deterrent,[11] British nuclear forces, though claimed to be an inseparable part of NATO’s deterrent, were signified by their independent functions.[12] Ernest Bevin ever reckoned that British nuclear deterrent, as the “Third Force”, could offset American-Soviet bipolarity.[13] Moreover, the existence of a second centre of decision, as some suggested, would ensure that even if the US did not use nuclear weapons in response to Soviet aggression in Europe, Britain, being much more directly affected, certainly would, and the Soviet leaders would know this. According to such rationale, possession of national nuclear deterrent could provide Britain more strategic flexibility and credibility if its national interests and security were threatened, and equally importantly could enhance Britain’s capability and influence as an “operational” nuclear Power. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not lead to discontinuity of Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons. The Labour Government, widely-known for its traditional anti-nuclear attitude, did not officially express any intention to discard nuclear deterrent though at present Britain’s nuclear force has been limited to Trident with reduced warheads. New Labour’s defence white papers, including the 1998 SDR, all insist that possession of nuclear weapons would be still necessary to assure Minimum Deterrence to those unknown enemy while vital national interests are at danger. Also, the British governments have not for a long time regarded Minimum Deterrence inconsistent with a policy designed to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states.[14] As the ultimate guarantee of national security, Britain’s nucle 酒店工作ar force is unlikely to be scrapped in a near future. Influence on American strategic postures Since Britain has chosen the US as a major ally through the transatlantic approach, the possession of nuclear weapons had been said to hopefully provide additional political and strategic advantages of strengthening the British claim to a special relationship with the US.[15] In fact, to many British, especially those in the military circles, the US would seriously consult with Britain on nuclear matters only if the latter possessed nuclear deterrent. Without credible national nuclear capacities, Britain could hardly retain its security and interests through NATO or the special relationship. As Sir Henry Tizard commented, “we feel that to have no share in what is recognised as the main deterrent in the cold war and the only allied offensive in a World War, would seriously weaken British influences on United States policy; and planning in the cold war, and in war, would mean that the United Kingdom would have no claim to any share in the policy and planning of the offensive.”[16] Sir John Slessor, another prominent military figure of British strategic thinking of his time, also believed that without national nuclear capabilities, “in peace, in the cold war, we should lose what influence we have on American policy and strategic planning. And if it came to hot war, we should have little or no say in the direction of Allied strategy or in the determination of terms of peace. We should be just one of the minor Powers.”[17] Analysis and Assessment The destructive power of nuclear weapons is unprecedented, and is viewed by many as the ultimate guarantee of national security. It will make sense to argue that possession of nuclear weapons by Britain, as the third member of the nuclear club, has somehow strengthened its power and influence in the world from several aspects previously discussed. Nevertheless, from other perspectives, or at least for some critics, such power and influence generated by nuclear weapons shall not be inappropriately exaggerated, and it is also very dangerous to put too much emphasis on such possession. The reasons are as follows. On Great Power Status In terms of Great Power status, nuclear weapons indeed have provided good qualifications, if not always, at least for a while after WWII. However, a membership of the nuclea 褐藻醣膠r club is not the only condition and cannot always guarantee international privilege. The following political, economic and technological developments all revealed the fact that the British could not possibly maintain their great powerhood simply by owing a few atomic bombs. The Suez crisis and other overseas contingencies, in which nuclear weapons were practically inapplicable, exposed the weakness of Britain’s economic and military capabilities. As criticism goes, nuclear weapons are just like an insurance policy for cancers, but useless for mild or even common illness. Without other effective supplements, such as credible conventional forces and strong economic performances, Britain can hardly remind other countries of its greatness. Britain’s expectation for sustaining its Great Power status was further challenged by the fact that its effective nuclear capacities required American assistance of various kinds. Indeed and realistically, no one, except those extreme patriots, would expect or ask Britain, especially during the Cold War period, to be “the greatest” or “great enough” as two superpowers, but foreign assistances were apparently not a positive feature of greatness. In fact, Britain is the only dependent nuclear power of the Big Five. It is e a weak statement to argue that as a “Great Power”, Britain’s nuclear capabilities cannot be independent, even though from financial viewpoints, its transfer deals with the US were quite favourable. On Contributions to NATO Compared with the military value, Britain’s nuclear deterrent can equally, if not more, provide it with additional political influences within the NATO system. By assigning its nuclear forces to NATO, Britain could logically transform these assets into political and diplomatic chips on the decision-making or bargaining tables. After the departure of France, Britain, as the second nuclear power in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, was more satisfied with the influence it had, while remaining some flexibility for its own strategic planning. Yet, it shall be reminded that NATO is an organisation under the political and military dominance of the US, which possessed much more nuclear weapons. It is natural to assume that NATO’s nuclear posture, including doctrines, operations and planning, predominantly reflected, or at least did not possibly violate, the viewpoints and interests of Washington.[18] It was quite qu 永慶房屋estionable that how much influence Britain could have simply by means of few nuclear stockpiles. However, it would be also improper to conclude that the British had no or little say in NATO’s strategic planning. In 1967, it was London and Bonn forced Washington to reach a compromised version of Flexible Response doctrine. But it was the political and military worth of the UK, rather than simply its nuclear weapons that made the US recede. Otherwise, West Germany, which had no “national” nuclear forces, could not likely join and play an important role in the change of NATO’s nuclear posture like those countries also deployed American nuclear weapons. Another example was the US proposal for the multilateral nuclear forces (MLF) in the 1960s. As some American officials insisted, the necessity to include Britain into that structure was not because its “tiny” nuclear forces, but the political needs to prevent West Germany as the dominant power within.[19] Again, it was Britain’s political leverage that mattered. On National Deterrence As an instrument of deterrence, nuclear weapons without doubt have increased British sense of security for countering Soviet aggressions. Interdependent deterrent would aim to attack targets, which the Americans attached lower priorities, such as submarine and medium-ranged air/missile bases. Meanwhile, considering the huge expenses on nuclear weapons, Britain’s doctrine of Minimum Deterrence seemed to satisfy its financial as well as strategic requirements. But even nuclear weapons are to be viewed as an effective protector of national security and can increase national military strength; their practical functions shall not be over-estimated and are restricted to the following circumstances. First of all, nuclear weapons, especially of the strategic level, are essentially the last resort, and for many anti-nuclear campaigners, are equivalent to the tools for suicide. To a populous island like Britain, the risk and cost of using nuclear weapons will be disastrous no matter in terms of the first attack or second strike. Secondly, the credibility of Britain’s Minimum Deterrence will be considerably reduced if without collaboration with NATO and of course, the US. This is the reason why since the late 1950s, Britain has decided to secure greater US strategic cooperation and to lay its nuclear posture on alliance.[20] Without the collective defence of NATO, Britain’s nuclear force alone is unlike to exert further active in 東森房屋fluences. Thirdly, as Britain tried to establish a second decision-making centre, such “independent” ideas, however, were not appreciated by the Americans.[21] According to US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, all decisions on nuclear weapons in NATO should be concentrated in one centre- Washington.[22] Division of nuclear command, which second decision-making theories could cause, would only complicate processes of decision-making and proliferation. Without Americans’ support and recognition, Britain’s second centre theories could not be properly accommodated into the NATO framework, which the British reckoned as the most crucial defence mechanism. Consequently, interdependence, if not dependence by nature, became the major objective of British nuclear doctrine and policy, and the role and influence of national Minimum Deterrence should not be overestimated. On Influencing the Americans Another issue raised is Britain’s influence on American strategic posture by owing nuclear weapons. Most readers would remember the post war unwillingness of the US to share nuclear development and research information had pushed Britain into a chiefly indigenous programme until the 1954, then 1958 revision of the McMahon Act. The following unbalanced development again frustrated Britain’s dignity and independence. The US, as an ally, was rarely asking British participation on the formation of combined nuclear targeting planning against Soviet threats. A noted scholar has made such comments: “Although a considerable amount of joint Anglo-American military planning was already under way, the question of the strategic employment of nuclear weapons was absolutely excluded.”[23] In terms of other nuclear policies, Washington seldom appreciated London’s proposals as well. For example, the US did not accept Britain’s proposition on international control of bomb after war,[24] and was lukewarm to UK’s nuclear disarmament effort, except 1963 treaty.[25] Washington also uncomfortably downplayed London’s anxiety for the risk of increasing conventional forces in Europe when the former was selling its Flexible Response ideas. Perhaps, Americans’ arrogance might come from the fact that the British needed US nuclear assistances, no matter in terms of politics and technology.[26] By contrast, Britain’s nuclear policy had always been influenced by the Americans since the very early stage of nuclear development. Again, if London could do some influences on the nuclear pol 有巢氏房屋icy-makers in Washington, that was mostly because of its political weight, not of possession of nuclear weapons. Conclusion The destructive power of nuclear weapons is catastrophic and has changed many strategic issues since their invention. By joining the nuclear club, even with limited capabilities, Britain in a sense has strengthened its power and influence in the world. From other perspectives, however, such promotion shall not be exaggerated. As the ultimate guarantee of national security, as some supporters claimed, nuclear weapons cannot be the only insurance policy for a state or the only element leading to greatness, no matter in peacetime or at war. In fact, to many, nuclear weapons alone cannot practically make Britain greater than other non-nuclear Powers, say Germany and Japan in terms of international status. If the UK can reserve a seat in the top group, that is because of its comprehensive national capabilities, not simply because of nuclear weapons. Finally, nuclear weapons as a deterrent was proven effective, at least somewhat psychologically, in the Cold War period, but after then, can nuclear deterrence still be credible for future grand strategy? Can a membership in the nuclear club continue providing Britain as many credits as before? Indeed, current threats no longer come from a nuclear giant bear of Siberia, and require new thinking under new international circumstances. It will be very important for the British to carefully think about what to do for the post-Trident era by efficiently using defence budget for a better security. Reference Books l Ball, Desmond and Richelson, Jeffery (eds.), Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986) l Beach, Hugh and Gurr, Nadine, Flattering the Passions or, the Bomb and Britain’s Bid for a World Role (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999) l Bracken, Paul, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1983) l Clark, Ian and Wheeler, Nicholas J., The British Origin of Nuclear Strategy 1945-1955 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1989) l Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan Press, 1981) l French, David, The British Way in Warfare: 1688-2000 (London: Unwin Hyman ltd, 1990) l Groom, A. J. R., British Thinking Abo 賣房子ut Nuclear Weapons (London: Frances Pinter, 1974) l Malone, Peter, The British Nuclear Deterrent (London: Croom Helm, 1984) l Navias, Martin S., Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning: 1955-1958 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) l Paterson, Robert, Britain’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrence: from before the V-bombers to beyond Trident (London: Frank Cass & co ltd., 1997) l Pierre, Andrew J., Nuclear Politics: the British experience with an independent strategic force: 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) l Rosecrane, R. N. (ed), The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: strategy and politics (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964) l Simpson, John, The Independent Nuclear State: the United States, Britain and the military atom (London: Macmillan, 1986) l Slessor, J., The Great Deterrent (London: Cassell & co., 1957) Government Publications and Political Documents l The Labour Party, Report of the Fifty-Sixth Annual Conference of the Labour Party (London: Transport House, 1957) l Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review CM3999 (London: HMSO, 1998) Journals l International Relations, 2-2, October 1965 (Garnet, J. C., “The Defence Debate”) l Political Science Quarterly, 80-1, March 1965 (Kohl, Wilfrid L., “Nuclear Sharing in NATO and the Multilateral Force”) About the author Ta-chen Cheng e-mail: yourdonason@yahoo.com Address: 11 Poplar Avenue, Reynoldson Street, Hull, HU5 3BW, United Kingdom The author is a Ph.D. student in University of Hull, England, Member of Taiwan Strategy Research Association, and UK Representative of the Office of Legislator Nelson C. L. Ku. [1] J. C. Garnett suggested a number of possible functions of British deterrent. Firstly, nuclear deterrent increased Britain’s influence with NATO and, in particular, with the United States. Secondly, nuclear deterrent Britain’s bargaining power in negotiation for nuclear test agreements and disarmament. The third task was to provide increased military power to support political policies outside the NATO area, namely in the global context. The fourth function was to provide Britain with a guarantee that if war were to break out in Europe, the United States would be involved. J. C. Garnet, “The Defence Debate”, in International Relations, vol. II, No. 2, October 1965, pp.81 酒肉朋友3-29.  .